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Abstract
The idea that democracy is under threat, after being largely dormant for at least
40 years, is looming increasingly large in public discourse. Complex systems
theory offers a range of powerful new tools to analyse the stability of social
institutions in general, and democracy in particular. What makes a democracy
stable? And which processes potentially lead to instability of a democratic
system? This paper offers a complex systems perspective on this question,
informed by areas of the mathematical, natural, and social sciences. We
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explain the meaning of the term ‘stability’ in different disciplines and discuss
how laws, rules, and regulations, but also norms, conventions, and expecta-
tions are decisive for the stability of a social institution such as democracy.
Keywords: complex systems, democracy, social system modelling, stability,
sociophysics, economics, statistical mechanics
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1. Introduction
1.1. Democratic backsliding
According to the media search engine Factiva, there were around 1500 articles published in
the global media during the 40 years between 1970 and 2010 that were concerned with a
‘threat to democracy’. In the period since then, in just over 8 years, more than 1700 articles
appeared on that topic, with the ﬁrst 5 months of 2018 (N= 309) already topping the total for
all of 2017 (N= 304). The idea that democracy is under threat, after being largely dormant for
at least 40 years, is looming increasingly large in public discourse. When The Economist
analysed the democracy score of 167 countries in early 2018, more than half the countries
saw their democratic-health index decline compared to the preceding decade14. How real
is this threat? How stable are today’s western democracies, some of which have survived
for centuries?
Whilst the last two centuries have featured a wider variety of ‘democratic transitions’,
where non-democratic countries become democratic, with some notable exceptions the
opposite phenomenon has been less frequent. We agree with Waldner and Lust (2018) who
remark: ‘we lack theories to explain backsliding, though we have long engaged in a perhaps
interminable debate about the causes of democratic transitions, democratic breakdowns,
authoritarian resilience, and democratic consolidation’. As a consequence there is a lack of
work on the question of under which circumstances might instability arise. The literature on
democratic transitions studies the circumstances under which regimes fall and which con-
tribute to non-democracies becoming democracies. But the circumstances under which
democracies become non-democracies, which is to say under which democracies destabilize
to the extent they cannot be described as democracies any more, are much less studied, and
mostly only in terms of single-case studies of particular situations, informed by very little in
the way of theory. This reﬂects the world we (in the West) have lived in over the relatively
recent past of the last 50–60 years. Times have changed. Citizens of democracies are less and
less content with their institutions; they are more and more willing to jettison institutions and
norms that have traditionally been regarded as central components of democracy; and they are
increasingly attracted to alternative, even autocratic regime forms (World Values Survey
2014). Furthermore, recent events in Europe, such as in Poland and Hungary, where elected
ofﬁcials have begun to put pressure on critical media and to undermine key institutions such
as independent courts, illustrate the need to rethink the assumption of democracies as stable
institutions. In the political sciences there is now a term for the opposite of democratic
transition: ‘democratic backsliding’. The composition of a list of examples of democratic
backsliding is an inherently controversial and politically loaded issue. An example of a
plausible methodology for inclusion on the list is a reduction in ‘democracy index’
14 https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat.
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(The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017, Freedom House 2018; see also Munck 2009) such
that a country falls precipitously from a previously high position. The Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) deﬁnes a ‘democracy index’ based on ﬁve categories: electoral process and
pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture and a range of indicators within these categories (The Economist Intelligence Unit
2017). In ﬁgure 1 we show the EIU democracy index for Norway, the USA, Hungary, Poland,
and North Korea for the years 2006–2017. The index for Hungary shows a clear downward
trend over the entire range, that for the USA shows a slight but monotonic fall from above 8
to just below 8.
1.2. Complex systems theory
The theory of complex systems is, at the least, a collection of concepts and methods which
bridges disciplines and brings into focus processes which act across time and length scales.
For some popular accounts of complex systems, see Holland (1992), Gell-Mann (1995a), and
Mitchell (2009). For more rigorous treatments, see Strevens (2005), Gell-Mann (1995b),
Ladyman et al (2013), and Holovatch et al (2017). There are many notions of a complex
system in the literature. Arguably, a minimal kind of a complex system is a collection of
many elements with many repeated interactions between them, which exhibits self-organi-
zation, that is, a system which sustains patterns without being controlled by a central or an
external element (Ladyman et al 2013). Living complex systems exhibit additional features
such as hierarchical organization and adaptive behaviour (Ladyman and Wiesner n.d.).
Examples of social complex systems with astounding levels of hierarchical organization and
adaptive behaviour are the eusocial societies of bees, termites, ants, and wasps. These have
been studied extensively and their behavioural dynamics are understood to a great extent
(Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, Gordon 2010, Seeley 2010). What is much less understood and
has much less theoretical foundation is the adaptive behaviour of complex social groups of
humans (Page 2010).
Figure 1. Democracy index for selected countries, as measured by the Economist
Intelligence Unit for 2006–2017. The EIU democracy index takes values between
0 (worst) and 10 (best). Shown are data for Norway (green), United States of America
(blue), Hungary (orange), Poland (red) and North Korea (black), the values for 2007
and 2009 are linear interpolations as no indices were reported for these two years.
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In our discussion, we focus on two features of complex social systems in general, and
democratic systems in particular: feedback and stability, and their mutual relationship. It is
generally known that negative feedback stabilizes a system. A simple example is the ther-
mostat, which monitors the temperature in a room and regulates the heating up or down when
the room temperature has surpassed a certain threshold. The dynamic of supply and demand
in standard economics is another example. An equilibrium price is reached and maintained
due to the negative feedback between the price of a product and demand for it—at least in
theory. Positive feedback, on the other hand, is a destabilizing phenomenon (‘positive’ in the
sense of ‘enhancing’, not in the sense of ‘desirable’). An example of positive feedback is the
melting of the polar icecaps upon atmospheric warming. Smaller surface areas of ice will
reduce the albedo effect of the ice on the atmospheric temperature and speed up the melting
process, an effect we observe at the moment (Chen et al 2006). The recruiting process in
honey bee societies is another example of positive feedback. Scouter bees advertising a new
nest site will recruit other bees to the same site. The more bees are recruited, the more will
advertise the site and again recruit others to it until, eventually, the number of scouter bees for
one site will pass a threshold and the site will be moved to by the entire hive. For examples of
positive feedback as a mechanism of ﬁnancial bubbles, see the discussion by Sornette and
Cauwels (2015).
As complex systems science reaches increasing maturity as part of the natural sciences, it is
now in the position to offer tools to tackle some of the big open questions relating to social
systems, such as the robustness of social institutions in general and of democracy in particular.
With this perspective article we hope to bring attention to these and other arising opportunities
for complex systems theory to address timely and important questions in political science.
2. Deﬁnitions of stability
2.1. (Modal) robustness versus (temporal) stability
The term ‘stability’ has different meanings in different ﬁelds and can be ambiguous even
within a ﬁeld. It is typically used in a sense that is synonymous with, for example,
‘robustness’, ‘resilience’, ‘viability’ or ‘adaptability’. In this section we consider the meaning
of notions of stability across different disciplinary contexts in order to provide a framework
for applying such notions to social institutions in general, and democracy in particular.
The natural place to start our discussion is at the most abstract and general level that is
given by the philosophical discussion of stability in the context of scientiﬁc models. There we
ﬁnd a useful distinction that can be made between ‘robustness’ and ‘stability’. Robustness is
understood as the insensitivity or independence of the behaviour of the system to changes in
possible microscopic realization (Weisberg 2006). Crucially, this is a modal notion, in that it
refers to different possible states of the world. Robustness in this sense is clearly very
important for model building in science since it allows for abstraction and the re-use of
models for different target systems (e.g. magnets and ﬂuids) or even different domains (e.g.
physical, biological and social systems). An example of modal robustness is found in machine
learning. We can deﬁne a machine learning problem as follows: ‘A computer programme is
said to learn from experience E w.r.t.some task T and some performance measure P, if its
performance on T, as measured by P, improves with experience E.’ (Mitchell 1997).
Generally speaking, a robust learning algorithm is one whose performance P is not altered
substantially when slight modiﬁcations are made to its experience E. Being robust in terms of
experience E is important because machine learning cares about generalization—i.e. per-
formance on new experience. A prototypical example of robustness from the physical
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sciences is the phenomenon of continuous phase transitions. Phase transitions are a macro-
scopic phenomenon almost completely independent of ﬁne-grained microscopic details. In
fact, one can demonstrate that systems with physically distinct micro-structure, such as ﬂuids
and ferromagnets, have the same qualitative and quantitative macroscopic behaviour when
they undergo a phase transition (Goldenfeld 1993). In contrast, stability is typically used to
refer to persistence over time or resistance to change or perturbation. We discuss various
examples of stability in the following sections. Thus, at this abstract level, a stable system
need not be robust nor a robust system stable.
2.2. Stability in nonlinear dynamics and complex networks
Stability in the sense of persistence over time or resistance to perturbation is part of the
general mathematical framework of dynamical systems theory. In this context equilibrium
points can be deﬁned in terms of a general stationarity property of particular solutions to a
system of (possibly nonlinear) differential equations. Stability can then be formally deﬁned
via the Lyapunov function: if the time rate of change of this function following small
perturbations from the equilibrium point is always negative or zero then the equilibrium state
is stable (Haddad and Chellaboina 2011). The equilibrium state is the ‘attractor’ of the
system. There may be more than one attractor for a given set of equations and, therefore,
stability here, also termed ‘resilience’ or ‘engineering stability’, is related to the local response
of the system to small perturbations. The systems in question might or might not be systems
of static variables. The concepts equally apply to systems of dynamic variables such as ﬂows.
Resilience to perturbation is also the stability concept relevant to the study of complex
networks15. Stability in complex networks refers to the invariance under perturbations of the
network topology and/or of the dynamical processes on the network. These perturbations can
be random or targeted, can involve removal of nodes and links, or can include changes to the
dynamical processes themselves. From a complex network perspective the signiﬁcant ques-
tions are then (for example): under what kind of perturbations does the network break apart
into isolated components? How persistent are the communities of nodes to perturbations?
How susceptible is a network dynamic to cascading failures? An example in case is the
resilience of public transport networks (Berche et al 2009).
2.3. Ecological stability and adaptation
The notion of ‘engineering stability’ can be further generalized to a notion of ‘ecological
stability’ (Walker et al 2004, Kovalenko and Sornette 2013). Ecological stability describes
the fact that a system state will return to its initial equilibrium point as long as the pertur-
bations do not kick the system out of the ‘basin of attraction’ of the equilibrium point. This
means that the system is stable with respect to non-local ﬁnite size perturbations, limited in
their size by the size of the basin of attraction.
Although very general, and certainly applicable to some biological and social systems
over some time scales, this notion of the ‘ecological stability’ of a dynamical system is still
not general enough to effectively encompass the full sense of stability needed. In particular,
the dynamical system analogy is limited by the fact that it fails to account for the possibility of
adaptation of system constituents under the inﬂuence of external stressors (Walker et al 2004,
Kovalenko and Sornette 2013). This requires taking into account the possibility for the system
to adapt its constituents so as to enhance its stability, for example by ‘topological transfor-
mations’ of the system’s state-space. The system may even transform itself into a completely
15 For an introduction to complex networks see, for example, Newman (2003).
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different structure via its capacity to evolve, as described by the theory of complex adaptive
systems (Holland 1975, Kauffman 1993). Stability in the sense of adaptation is related to the
concept of ‘viability’ as deﬁned in Aubin (1991), Deffuant and Gilbert (2011).
2.4. Stability in statistical mechanics
After closer inspection of the principles underlying robustness and stability there are good
reasons to expect the two concepts to be related. That is, the physical principles that underlie
the robustness of a system (i.e. insensitivity to modal variations) can be connected to those
that underlie the stability of a system (i.e. insensitivity to temporal variations). An example of
this is the stability of equilibria in statistical mechanics. Although this is a vexed and con-
troversial issue, recent work on the foundations of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics
(Werndl and Frigg 2015) points to a new formal deﬁnition of equilibrium based upon the
existence of a macro-state in which the system spends a majority of the time in the long run.
Crucially for our purposes, such a deﬁnition immediately implies that, given a microscopic
perturbation that takes the system away from equilibrium, the dynamics will, in general, lead
the system back to equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium state in this sense is a stable state. It is
also a robust state in the sense that the equilibrium state is the one with the largest number of
ﬁne-grained micro-states or microscopic conﬁgurations associated with it. Another sense in
which a statistical mechanical equilibrium is robust is that this state is insensitive to modal
variation of initial conditions: different possible initial conditions will lead back to the same
stable equilibrium macro-state. A further signiﬁcant feature of the principles of statistical
mechanical equilibria is that they have a natural relationship with the notion of equilibrium
found in thermodynamics, where the equilibrium state is that in which the thermodynamical
functions of state are approximately invariant. Although such a connection is satisfying from
a physical science perspective, it suggests a simple and obvious objection to the viability of
this notion of Boltzmannian statistical mechanical equilibrium for the analysis of the stability
of social systems. Since social systems are typically wildly out of thermal equilibrium the
sense in which we should understand them as stable surely must be disjoint with thermo-
dynamic equilibrium. Moreover, when we are talking about living systems, of which social
systems are of course a subset, any reference to ‘the long run’ is surely misplaced: as
Maynard Keynes famously remarked, in the long run we are all dead! To understand the
stability of social systems we clearly need to move beyond a statistical mechanical or ther-
modynamical modelling framework. This does not prevent us from using tools of statistical
mechanics in the modelling of social dynamics, as we will see in the examples in section 2.6.
2.5. Stability in economics
The ﬁnal, most difﬁcult and, for our purposes, most signiﬁcant set of concepts of stability that
we should consider are those in economics. By analogy with the physical sciences, the
notions of stability found in economics are closely related to the notions of equilibrium. The
modern concept of economic equilibrium is a unique or optimal solution to a system of
equations in a model. Examples are resource allocation in (Walrasian) welfare economics and
vectors of best response strategies in (non-cooperative) game theory. However, as a frame-
work for studying the stability of real economic systems, such an approach is limited because
the stability in question in these concepts is essentially modal rather than temporal (these
stable states of equilibrium are more like robustness concepts than stability concepts). The
history of the concept of equilibrium in economics is complicated but we can distinguish a
more intuitive equilibrium concept that pre-dates the modern one. This older version is the
Eur. J. Phys. 40 (2019) 014002 K Wiesner et al
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equalisation of, for example, supply and demand in a market for trade in goods. Equilibrium
in this older sense does arguably identify states that persist upon perturbation and is therefore
dynamical rather than modal. Polemicists and policy-makers often make arguments that slide
between and conﬂate these different concepts of equilibrium16.
Opposed to these theoretical notions of stability, and at least as important, is some kind of
overarching empirical stability. How the theoretical notions of equilibrium map onto real
systems and to empirical notions of stability is entirely a function of which member of a
family of models is under consideration and of the relative tractability (numerical or other-
wise) of alternatives. Historically, that mapping was very tenuous or non-existent because
tractability constraints were so binding. Over the last 25–30 years there has been a sea change
in economics mainly because these tractability constraints have been relaxed with more and
more computational power becoming available. Economics has undergone a change from a
largely theory dominated to a data dominated discipline. This has allowed the focus to be
shifted to broader empirical notions of stability (which are arguably closer to older more
intuitive conceptions of supply and demand equilibria) which include the absence of
large ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial markets, low unemployment and inﬂation, increasing GDP.
Thus, the relevant notions of economic stability most relevant prove to be dynamical and
wedded to social and political institutions, rather than modal.
Different conceptions of equilibrium, as considered above, can be thought of as nested
within more general systems. This may help to better understand the relationship between
equilibria and empirical stability. Consider a system S1 (say, a labour market) nested inside a
system S2 (say, a macro-economy as guided by a central bank), with models M1 and M2
respectively. If E1 and E2 are equilibria, they will be solutions, respectively, to systems of
equations that constitute M1 and M2. E1 will tend to identify a relatively stable state of S1
just in case the state variables that characterize M2 correspond to processes in S2 that evolve
on a measurably longer time scale than the state variables in M1 that correspond to processes
in S1. Thus one typically cannot assess whether the equilibrium of a model corresponds to an
empirically stable conﬁguration of the world without understanding the general ecology of
modelled systems in which the model under assessment (i.e. M1) is embedded. Times
of profound social and political change might be regarded as circumstances in which the rate
of evolution of processes designated by state variables in the highest-level models speeds up,
which would then undermine correspondences between equilibria and stability in the lower-
level, nested systems. A complication is that S1 and S2 are often entangled rather than
constituting a hierarchy. (That is, there are feedback loops between the processes that con-
stitute them.) This can imply conditions in which the fact that a set of state variable values is
an equilibrium provides no predictive leverage for assessing the stability of the corresponding
state of the world.
An instructive case is that of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis which, according to a common
charge, had not been foreseen by economists. Macroeconomists running the popular dynamic
16 International trade economics provides an example of this. A statement such as ‘universal free trade is the
optimally efﬁcient equilibrium’ is using ‘equilibrium’ in the modern sense; that is, it is a solution to a set of equations
of a model of international trade. It effectively says that in an unregulated world every trade barrier would be
‘arbitraged away’ (effectively disappear through traders who exploit these opportunities). In this sense, the free trade
equilibrium is a unique solution in the model. But this is not why the economist’s point is supposed to convince
anyone to politically support free trade. They are supposed to be convinced because otherwise there’ll be waste from
excess supply or demand somewhere. This latter argument is based on the dynamical sense of equilibrium rather than
the modal, ‘modern’ sense of equilibrium. The confusion lies in the fact that unless all countries are small (meaning
none can individually inﬂuence prices in any sector) there are multiple equilibria in the dynamical sense, and most of
them do not incorporate free trade. So one is only persuaded by ‘free trade is an equilibrium’ if one slides between the
two equilibrium concepts. (Of course one might favour free trade on the basis of some other argument.)
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stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models largely believed the economy was stable and
that there was little risk of a crisis. Nonetheless, ﬁnancial economists had predicted the crisis
in mortgage markets, and had published models of the mechanisms by which this crisis could
be transmitted into the extra-ﬁnancial economy (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). The problem
was that the ﬁnancial and DSGE models did not inform one another. Many macroeconomists
think that the charge that they mis-predicted stability is unfair to them. This is because their
consultant role, as researchers sharing the concerns of central bankers, was to study the
instruments of monetary policy that central banks control. The speciﬁc stability they were
therefore interested in was around output and investment not ﬁnancial asset values. And
neither output trends in the OECD (which were smoothly rising) nor the trend line in the ratio
of investment to output (smoothly falling) were disturbed, except quite brieﬂy, by the 2008
crisis or the subsequent Euro crisis. (There were exceptions in some individual rich countries,
namely Ireland, Greece, and Spain.) So DSGE modellers can argue that ‘the economy’, in the
sense that professionally matters to them, was in fact stable just as they said. Note that
macroeconomists are divided over the persuasiveness of this defence. This reﬂects con-
troversy within macroeconomics over whether unemployment is a real variable in the models
central banks should use. Roughly, New Keynesians think it is and ‘New Classicals’ think it
is not. Clearly, the demand for labour was not stable in 2007.
One determinant of the stability of modern democratic orders is the extent to which
institutions, especially civil service bureaucracies and agencies, maintain legality and pro-
cedural legitimacy against populist and authoritarian threats. It is unlikely that any such
uniﬁed notion of democratic stability could in principle map onto any reﬁned equilibrium
concept from economics. Nonetheless one can consider how institutions, such as legal ones,
might support the empirical stability of democratic systems. In current work in progress, Don
Ross applies Wynn Stirling’s conditional game theory (Stirling 2012, 2016) to model the
capacities of bureaucracies to protect rule of law against populist authoritarian politicians.
This protective capacity in Ross’ model is a function of the extent to which ofﬁcials choose
strategies and actions under the inﬂuence of shared professional norms that they are conﬁdent
will be maintained by their colleagues. This formal model is intended to provide measures by
which the relative strength of this source of stability could be estimated empirically. We will
revisit the role of norms in section 3.3. Next, we discuss some examples of models for
complex social systems which use concepts and tools from statistical mechanics and non-
linear dynamics.
2.6. Examples of social system modelling
The last 20 years have seen an upswell in a new type of mathematical models of human
society, which has been inspired by analogies between social behaviour and the statistical
properties of condensed matter physics. Work in this tradition has come to be known as
sociophysics (Galam 2012). Although the models developed within this discipline are highly
idealized, they have provided insight into the occurrence of extreme political events including
democratic backsliding. An important example of sociophysics models of opinion dynamics
was developed by Galam (2002) to analyse the causes of minority opinion spreading. The
model uses real space renormalization group techniques borrowed from physics to drive the
dynamics of opinion formation in a large population of agents divided into small groups.
Brieﬂy the model is set up as follows. Each agent is represented by a state variable with two
possible states representing two different opinions. Dynamics are determined by the type of
agents. Floaters, for example, are agents who change their mind according to the opinion of
the majority in their vicinity. Contrarians oppose the opinion held by the majority, and
Eur. J. Phys. 40 (2019) 014002 K Wiesner et al
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inﬂexibles never change their mind. The system has two attracting states, each of which is
characterized by every agent sharing the same opinion. Which of these attractors the system
ends up in is a function of the initial proportion in the population sharing the respective
opinion. In the case of all agents being ﬂoaters and with no bias in the local majority rule
(renormalization group transformation), the threshold is 50%. However, the incorporation of
heterogeneous agents such as contrarians and inﬂexibles can shift the threshold from 50%
down to 10%, thus allowing for the opinion of a tiny minority to propagate and dominate the
entire population. These results are important because they suggest a highly nonlinear effect
of contrarians and inﬂexibles on opinion formation, which can eventually lead to dictatorial
outcomes. The model was used, for example, to explain the French hoax regarding 9/11
(Galam 2003) and to predict the highly improbable political vote outcome in the French
referendum on the European constitution (Galam 2002). Empirical studies have conﬁrmed
that minorities can have considerable inﬂuence, in particular when they are perceived as
consistent and competent (Maass and Clark 1984).
Dynamical systems techniques also offer a range of tools to analyse opinion formation.
An example is modelling ‘hidden’ opinion formation processes as a saddle-node bifurcation
—a change in the nature of the attracting state in a dynamical system from stable to unstable
or vice versa (Brummitt et al 2015). Such an approach, taking into account the perception of
other people’s will to rebel and the availability of non-local information about revolutions in
other countries, was used to model the Arab Spring rising (Brummitt et al 2015). We will
revisit hidden opinion formation when we discuss the inﬂuence of social media on political
discourse in section 3.3. Another example is the modelling of preference falsiﬁcation—
misrepresenting one’s wants under social pressure. Preference falsiﬁcation is relevant for
understanding the formation of hidden mass support for anti-democratic sentiments which
only becomes visible when political equilibrium is already destabilizing. The difference
between publicly disclosed and private political preferences was used to explain, for example,
why some revolutions were hard to predict (Kuran 1989) and why the polls before Brexit and
Trump’s election were apparently misleading (Wu et al 2018). The recent election of Donald
Trump may represent a similar case, as revealed by research into the discrepancy between
private and public attitudes towards immigration (Bursztyn et al 2017).
Complex networks are frequently used to model social dynamics. An example is the user
dynamics in online social media. An equilibrium point is considered to be a steady number of
active online users of an online social media platform. Assuming a function of cost and
beneﬁts for a user being active, the complex network tool of k-core decomposition ﬁnds a
(Nash) equilibrium between cost and beneﬁt which maximizes the number of active users
(Garcia et al 2013). This is reminiscient of economic equilibrium of supply and demand.
Despite the apparent simplicity of this approach, calibrating the microdynamics of social
behaviour can be a non-trivial task. For example, individual decisions can depend non-
monotonically on the social environment (Garcia et al 2017), leading to highly connected
users to trigger cascades of others leaving, an example of an unexpected collective response
to changes in the environment of an online community.
Social adaptation can also be modelled with the tools of dynamical systems. While some
civilisations persist for centuries, others suddenly disappear over a very short time span
(Scheffer and Westley 2007). The Anasazi are an example of this. It is believed that their
reliance on established rules, sophisticated norms and traditions created rigidity that slowed
down behaviour change and hindered adaptation to new environmental conditions. This
phenomenon of a slowing down adaptation ending in catastrophic failure of the system has
been modelled as a so-called ‘cusp catastrophe’—a dynamical system moving on a state-
space manifold across points of inﬁnite gradient (Scheffer et al 2003). A long perspective in
Eur. J. Phys. 40 (2019) 014002 K Wiesner et al
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the system dynamics of a society informed (Turchin 2010) prediction of an increase of
political instability, as opposed to more optimistic contemporary predictions. This prediction
was enabled by the methods of cliodynamics, i.e. the quantitative analysis of history. In
particular, structural-demographic theory models society as a dynamical system in which
inequality and elite overproduction endogenously generate the kind of instability that we
currently observe in democratic countries (Turchin 2016). This approach has shed light on
historical stages of political violence such as the French Revolution and the American Civil
War (Turchin 2012), laying the ground for future work on democratic backsliding.
3. Stability of democracy
3.1. Destablization of social institutions through feedback loops
The above discussion suggests that scholars of democracy need to move away from argu-
ments based on static equilibrium to more dynamic frameworks which are better suited to
understanding how stable the equilibria are to perturbations. Some perturbations may cause
temporary instability. Others may set in train self-reinforcing changes that may have long-
term consequences, up to and including the transition from democracy to non-democracy.
Such a dynamic framework provides a better approach for understanding democratic back-
sliding than much of the existing work, which (as summarized in Waldner and Lust 2018)
often focuses on the consequences of static factors for what are inevitably dynamic outcomes.
We will now work through some speciﬁc ways in which perturbations may affect the political
process and lead to politically self-reinforcing consequences.
In the US, real income growth has largely stagnated since the 1960s for people at or below
the median income. Most of the increase in disposable income has instead beneﬁted top income
earners. To illustrate, the total share of income earned by the top 1% of the income distribution
has doubled from 10% in 1979 to around 20% in 2013. In 2013 the top 1% of families made
more than 25 times as much as the remaining 99% of the population (Sommeiller et al 2016).
The consequences of inequality are manifold and have been thoroughly examined (see for
example Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, Piketty and Saez 2014). In a nutshell, greater inequality is
associated with poorer health outcomes and social problems, ranging from lower life expec-
tancy, obesity, deteriorated mental health, drug use, lower educational performance, to teenage
births and violence to name a few (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Particularly relevant in this
context is the ﬁnding that inequality is also associated with political polarization. For example,
US senators from states with high levels of income inequality have been found to be more
polarized than other senators (Garand 2010).
As Page and Gilens (2017) have argued, ‘the health of democracy and the extent of
economic inequality have tended to rise and fall together.’ The most plausible pathway
through which economic inequality can affect the quality of democracy and vice versa
involves institutions. Democracy presupposes a basic equality of inﬂuence. As economic
inequality increases, so too do differences of inﬂuence over institutions. Those who have
substantial ﬁnancial resources are better able than those without to inﬂuence institutional
change.
These dynamics are likely to become especially visible after a ﬁnancial shock. Consider
the following plausible dynamic: under a situation of moderate economic inequality, high
inﬂuence actors have reshaped institutions to provide them with asymmetrically high
economic beneﬁts. They are then able to use some of these beneﬁts to further reshape
institutions in ways that advantage them, setting them on a long-term trajectory towards
high economic inequality, and institutions that reinforce that inequality. This trajectory may
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appear invisible to most voters, who pay little attention to politics, and in particular to the
complex regulatory questions where it is easiest to create self-reinforcing trajectories.
However, when there is an exogenous shock requiring painful adjustments, previously
invisible institutional protections may become visible, as those who are highly inﬂuential
shape the adjustments so that the costs fall disproportionately lightly on them, and dis-
proportionately heavily on others. This is likely to generate substantial grievances among a
majority that sees itself falling ever further behind. Moreover, the relationship between high
inequality and institutional change may have long-term consequences by corroding the
relationship between voters’ choices and institutional outcomes by, for example, dis-
couraging less well off people from voting, or excluding large groups, and may conse-
quently lead to effective or actual non-democratic rule.
Of course, neither of these tendencies are inevitable. As Page and Gilens (2017) point
out, economic shocks and high levels of economic inequality may generate democratic
counterpressures too, by giving unhappy citizens greater incentives to mobilize around their
shared interests against disproportionately powerful elites. Yet scientiﬁc attention to these
dynamics—and to understanding when they are simply self-reinforcing, and when they may
set in motion countervailing forces—is warranted. Piketty (2015) claimed that
the study of inequality dynamics and institutional change are intimately
related. The development of stable institutions and the construction of a
legitimate and centralized government are closely linked to the way different
societies are able to address the issue of social inequality in a peaceful and
orderly manner K Institutions do not arise out of harmonious societies
populated by representative agents; they arise out of unequal societies and out
of conﬂict.
Recent work by Farrell and Shalizi (2015) explains how some degree of diversity and
partisan disagreement in a democracy is healthy and even necessary, if democracy is to
harness different perspectives to understand and address joint problems. However, too much
diversity may lead to democratic breakdown, as actors forsake the minimal agreement on
interests that they need to work together and the minimal agreement on facts that they need to
identify and agree on common problems. Waldner and Lust (2018) argue that one crucial
causal factor explaining the survival of democracy is whether there is a sufﬁcient coalition
that supports democratic institutions. This coalition can be undermined by radicalization and
polarization. Radicalization happens when political elites try to reshape politics to secure
them permanent advantage by ‘bend[ing] the rules, ignor[ing] norms, and pursu[ing] strate-
gies that would have seemed off limits’. Polarization involves a breakdown of common faith,
so that members of one partisan coalition ‘ignore potential threats to democracy’, based on the
belief that having their opponents come to power would be worse.
These dynamics can become self-reinforcing when political actors have incentives to
spread disinformation and increase radicalization and polarization for short-term goals. The
US has less heavily regulated media than other advanced industrialized democracies where
this has in some cases at least limited this process of polarization. It is notable that ‘fake news’
has been a problem long before the arrival of online social media. In the US, talk radio and
Fox News not only catered to a conservative constituency hungry for information and per-
spectives that validated its beliefs—they helped create that constituency through a feedback
loop fed by commercial imperatives between media and audiences (Benkler et al 2018). In
fact, they and their listeners and viewers created an entire mythological universe, in which
Barack Obama was collaborating with internationalists to take away guns from conservatives.
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Most recently, Breitbart.com, prisonplanet.com and other websites have employed a similar
approach to build up audience share.
Similarly, partisan competition and the desire to support or frustrate policy goals may
lead to feedback loops between media and political actors. The debate on climate change is an
example of this. Climate change became a banner of partisan identity thanks to the combi-
nation of conservative media and pseudo-scientiﬁc think tanks such as the Heartland Institute.
Fox News played a key role in publicizing—and indeed organizing—the ‘Tea Party’
(Skocpol and Williamson 2016), despite the misgivings of its CEO Roger Ailes
(Sherman 2014).
Both processes may reinforce each other, and both may be reinforced by the newer
incentive systems of social media, which have created an algorithmically moderated infor-
mation market that is characteristically biased towards user ‘engagement’ which in practice
may frequently mean shocking or salacious content. Small-scale investigations suggest, for
example, that YouTube recommendation algorithms tend to lead viewers quickly towards
conspiratorial videos (Bessi et al 2016). Together, social inequality and feedback loops
between media, audiences and political actors may weaken democracy through increasing
polarization among citizens, and encouraging politicians to bend rules without fearing pun-
ishment from their supporters.
3.2. Democracy as public good
It is instructive in this context to consider democracy as a ‘public good’, something that is
both useful for everyone and that is in principle available to and can be used by everyone.
Ideally, the collective use of democracy ensures the allocation of a nation’s resources to the
common social good. However, it is well recognized that public goods are susceptible to the
‘tragedy of the commons’, another example of a positive feedback loop leading ultimately to
collapse. It is often illustrated by the example of cattle herders sharing a common parcel of
land on which they are each entitled to let their cows graze. If unregulated, each herder will
put more than their allotted number of cattle on the common to receive additional beneﬁts.
This will ultimately lead to overgrazing, a harm shared by the whole group. While all herders
made the individually rational economic decision, the commons becomes depleted or even
destroyed, to the detriment of all. A similar and therefore rather pessimistic prediction has
been made for the democratic process of voting. Alexander Tyler (a Scottish history professor
at The University of Edinburgh) wrote in 1787 on ‘The Fall of The Athenian Republic’ some
2000 years prior:
A democracy is always temporary in nature; it simply cannot exist as a per-
manent form of government. A democracy will continue to exist up until the
time that voters discover that they can vote themselves generous gifts from
the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the
candidates who promise the most beneﬁts from the public treasury, with the
result that every democracy will ﬁnally collapse due to loose ﬁscal policy,
(which is) always followed by a dictatorship.
Reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons, Tyler predicts that a majority of voters
exploit their democratic power to ‘vote themselves generous gifts’, the economic structure
collapses and crises follow. Elinor Ostrom and colleagues have studied many cases sus-
ceptible to the tragedy of the commons and have outlined an approach, called ‘collective
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actions’, which identiﬁes eight design principles for stable local common pool resource
management.
1—Clearly deﬁned boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties).
2—Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted
to local condition.
3—Collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in
the decision-making process.
4—Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators.
5—A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules.
6—Mechanisms of conﬂict resolution that are cheap and of easy access.
7—Self-determination of the community recognized by higher-level authorities.
8—In the case of larger common pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers
of nested enterprises, with small local common pool resources at the base level.
It is not obvious, a priori, how to apply these design principles to the democratic process
as it is implemented in most modern democracies. But these principles can help in rethinking
the voting act because they are designed speciﬁcally to interrupt positive feedback loops
leading to detrimental outcomes for the common good. One might argue that Switzerland’s
direct democracy is close to implementing some of these eight design principles, for instance
by having clear boundaries for the political voting process (local, cantonal, and federal votes–
principle 1), by regularly putting decisions directly to the voters (principle 3), and by the
existence of a clear self-determination and empowerment of communities who see the direct
consequences of their votes at the local as well as federal level (principle 7).
3.3. Destablization of social institutions through erosion of social norms
Democracy is not merely a codiﬁcation of laws, rules, and regulations. Much of democracy
relies on norms, conventions, and expectations of people’s behaviour. Numerous psycholo-
gical processes thus contribute to the stability of a democracy or threats to it. To shed light on
some of these, it is worth revisiting the role of online social media. Much has been written
about the impact of social media on public discourse and the multiple threats it presents to
democracy (Persily 2017). Two of those impacts have received relatively little attention to
date and deserve to be highlighted.
First, there is a plethora of evidence to suggest that the strength with which people hold
an opinion is proportionate to the extent to which they believe it to be shared by others. We
are unlikely to give credence to a claim that the Earth is ﬂat because we know that everybody
believes it to be round. But what if this signal is distorted? We have already seen how extreme
views can move into the mainstream when they are legitimized by actual or presumed
majority endorsement. There is a related process, uniquely facilitated by social media, that
serves to entrench extreme opinions and make them resilient to change. To illustrate, a recent
study by Leviston et al (2013) on people’s attitudes about climate change showed that only a
small minority of people, between 5% and 7% in their Australian sample, denied that climate
change was happening. However, those minority respondents thought that their opinion was
shared by between 43% and 49% of the population. The massive discrepancy between actual
and conjectured prevalence of an opinion (around 40% in this case) is known as the false
consensus effect (Krueger and Zeiger 1993). When people believe that their opinion is widely
shared, they are particularly resistant to belief revision (Leviston et al 2013), are less likely to
compromise, and more likely to insist that their own views prevail (Miller 1993). The fact that
any opinion, no matter how absurd, will be shared by at least some of the more than one
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billion Facebook users worldwide (Synnott et al 2017), creates an opportunity for the
emergence of a false consensus effect around any fringe opinion because the social signal is
distorted by global interconnectivity.
Second, people’s information diet on social media is now at least partly determined by
algorithms (Pariser 2011). It is known that people’s personality attributes can be inferred from
their pattern of behaviour on social media. Youyou et al (2015) showed that a computer
algorithm could infer people’s personality on the basis of just 10 Facebook likes more
accurately than human work colleagues. This success rate increased with the number of likes,
and the programme outperformed people’s spouses—the best available human judges—when
it had access to 300 likes. When such highly personal data are made accessible to political
operatives, as demonstrably happened during the recent Brexit referendum in the UK and
during the 2016 US presidential election, this opens the door to ‘micro-targeting’ of messages
that exploit people’s unique vulnerabilities. It has been claimed that this enabled the small
company Cambridge Analytica to depress turnout among potential Clinton voters and to
discover hidden Trump voters (Persily 2017). The effects of micro-targeting are not fully
understood, and may indeed not be especially signiﬁcant using current technologies (Benkler
et al 2018). What must be noted, however, is that the micro-targeting of messages may be at
odds with the democratic fundamentals. The foundational idea of a democracy is that it
provides a public market place of ideas, however imperfect, where competing positions are
discussed and decided upon. We suggest that this entails a normative imperative to provide
the opportunity that opponents can rebut each other’s arguments. This possibility for
engagement and debate is destroyed when messages are disseminated in secret, targeting
individuals based on their personal vulnerabilities to persuasion, without their knowledge and
without the opponent being able to rebut any of those arguments. These normative and ethical
aspects of micro-targeting are only just beginning to be debated (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al
2018). These impacts of social media on public discourse show how democracies can be
vulnerable in ways against which institutional structures and historical traditions offer little
protection.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we discussed some of the many mechanisms resulting in institutional instability,
ranging from social inequality and ﬁnancial shocks to disconnected information ﬂow on
modern social media. We have illustrated how many of these mechanisms are interconnected,
meaning that their temporal and/or spatial dynamics are not separable but inﬂuence each
other to a signiﬁcant degree. We have focused in particular on the role of positive feedback
(positive in the sense of ‘enhancing’, not in the sense of ‘desirable’) which leads to mutual
enhancement. In addition, many of the mechanisms relevant for the democratic process are
multiply interconnected. This interconnectedness might seem an insurmountable hindrance
for analysing, modelling and, ultimately, understanding these processes for which we, not
least, require the knowledge and tools from many different disciplines of the natural and
social sciences. But successful cross-disciplinary research of interconnected phenomena is
possible. To mention a few examples relevant in this context, Hsiang et al (2013) showed the
strong inﬂuence that deviations of climate variables from their mean have on the occurrence
of human conﬂict and institutional change; Sornette and Cauwels (2014) used tools from the
statistical mechanical theory of phase transitions to identify the many ﬁnancial bubbles which
were ﬂourishing over the pre-2008 period as a warning sign for the great crash to come; and
an example in practice is the SARS epidemic in 2003 which was successfully contained by
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the WHO in collaboration with ofﬁcials using tools beyond epidemiology, informed by
complex network theory, web-based alert systems, and air transportation control17.
We conclude that the scientiﬁc and quantitative analysis of the question of stability of
democracy is possible and, indeed, necessary. It requires a concerted effort across the
mathematical, natural and social sciences. In particular, the insights and tools from com-
plexity science deserve more attention in this endeavour.
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